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to the ‘commentator’ format. Also familiar in Reasoner-driven
events are ‘masterclasses’ (high-level introductions into a re-
search area) replacing traditional keynotes, and various types
of poster sessions.
It is fair to say, though, that the majority of large events that
are organised these days – certainly in philosophy and eco-
nomics – has found its equilibrium in a few keynote talks and
30 Minute slots in parallel sessions. Smaller conferences and
workshops often see longer 40-60 Minutes slots. Most of these
talks are driven by the speaker presenting a slideshow and some
time for discussion at the end, often referred to as the ‘Q&A’.
There is, given the large number of events, very little variation
in the format. As Reasoners, we may be moved to ask this.
What kind of reasoning gets done in these formats? And could
other formats be more conducive to reasoning together?
I have come to think of the above equilibrium of received
events formats as suboptimal. One aspect of the current default
formats is that they require that presenters spend a large amount
of time on perfecting talks and slideshows (alternatively, they
require large amounts of patience in the audience if presenters
did not prepare their talks well enough). Another aspect is, for
me, that these slots of 30-45 Minutes feel mostly either too long
or too short, but not often ‘about right’. Yet, if we were to re-
place such sessions with, say, short pitches of five Minutes and
lots of time for discussion, many might feel dis-oriented. Or,
if we were to install a regime in which full papers are not only
mandatory to submit beforehand, but also insist on them being
read (for instance, by adopting roundtable or reading group-
style formats for parallel sessions), many might not only feel
dis-oriented, but also over-burdened. Methinks this kind of dis-
orientation or feeling of being asked a lot in relation to events
might be conducive to making more out of the time that is spent
together in one location than the current standard format. But
it remains a hurdle.
Perhaps it is inevitable that, after a period of expanding event
proliferation, there is now a settled format that is predictable,
and thus incurs low costs of attending a conference, once par-
ticipants get the hang of it. Moreover, a predictable format has
many advantages in terms of facilitating exchanges. All this,
however, does not mean that it is impossible to change such
standard formats. Some formats like masterclasses, roundtable
discussions, and poster sessions are gaining ground, albeit
slowly, in some of the bigger events.
Perhaps we should ask more what goals we have in brining
scholars together in a particular event, and what kind of ex-
changes (and styles and formats of reasoning together) an event
should facilitate, and then look for the right format to support
these goals. As it has become easier to attend and organise
events, that seem to me the right questions to ask.
Conrad Heilmann




a subsection within the
“What’s Hot in Mathemat-
ical Philosophy” column,
which will be devoted to the
“Formal Epistemology of
Medicine”. This new strand
of research analyses issues
arising in medical episte-
mology by examining the
interaction of methodolog-
ical, social and regulatory
dimensions in medicine.
The motivation for adopting
a formal approach stems
from its higher capability
to describe the “rules of the
game” and to provide an
analytic explanatory account of the investigated phenomena.
The idea emerges out of the ERC project “Philosophy of
Pharmacology: Safety, Statistical Standards, and Evidence
Amalgamation” hosted by the MCMP until June 2017, and
now by the Univpm (Ancona, Italy) – with MCMP further
remaining involved as additional beneficiary. The project
consists in two main research strands: 1) developing a jus-
tificatory framework for probabilistic confirmation of causal
hypotheses; 2) a game-theoretic approach to epistemic issues
around (medical) evidence.
1. Formalisation of scientific inference within the Bayesian
epistemology tradition has generally aimed at providing math-
ematical explanations of various inferential phenomena in the
sciences: confirmatory support of coherent evidence, confir-
matory role of explanatory power, the role of replication in as-
sessing the reliability of evidence, the no-alternatives and the
no-miracles arguments (see e.g. Crupi V. Chater N., & Ten-
tori K. New axioms for probability and likelihood ratio mea-
sures. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2013,
64(1), 189–204; Dawid R., Hartmann S., & Sprenger J. The
No Alternatives Argument. British Journal for the Philoso-
phy of Science, 2015, 66, 213–234; Fitelson B. A probabilistic
theory of coherence. Analysis, 2003, 63(279), 194–199). We
drew on this tradition in order to exploit the confirmatory sup-
port of heterogeneous sources of evidence, and to expand the
justificatory toolset in such domains as drug risk management
and policy-making (Landes J. Osimani B. Poellinger R. (2017)
Epistemology of causal inference in pharmacology. Towards
a framework for the assessment of harms. European Journal
for Philosophy of Science). This also goes in the direction
advocated by Gelman (Gelman A. Working through some is-
sues. Significance 12.3 (2015): 33-35.) and Marsman et al. (A
Bayesian bird’s eye view of ‘Replications of important results
in social psychology’. R Soc Open Sci. 2017, 4(1): 160426)
invoking a more comprehensive approach to evidence, in the af-
termath of the “reproducibility crisis”. In analogy with Bogen
and Woodwards’ distinction between data and phenomena (Bo-
gen J., Woodward J. Saving the Phenomena. The Philosophical
Review, 1988, 97 (3): 303-52), our framework breaks down
the inferential path from data to hypotheses into two steps: one
from data to abstract causal indicators; the other one, from such
indicators to the causal hypothesis itself. This also helps de-
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press some crosstalk in the philosophical literature, generated
by conflating ontological, epistemological, and methodological
issues around causal inference.
2. The scientific ecosystem in which the above epistemic dy-
namics are embedded is characterised by the joint interaction
of several features: 1) medical products are so called “credence
products”, that is, products for which the consumer (medical
community, patients, and the public health system) cannot eval-
uate the quality prior to (and often not even after) consumption
2) information asymmetry affects epistemic interchange at vari-
ous levels (patient vs. doctor, policy makers vs. scientific com-
munity, state-of-the-art-knowledge vs. Nature), and may be ob-
viously exploited and lead to various phenomena such as sup-
pliers’ induced demand, or disease mongering; 3) producers of
medical knowledge often have vested interests in the research
outputs and dissemination, leading them to engage in strategic
behavior regarding evidence exhibition (whose features may
also evolve in time: see Bennett Holman, The Fundamental
Antagonism: Science and Commerce in Medical Epistemol-
ogy. 2015, PhD Dissertation, University of California, Irvine).
This strongly impacts on the processes and norms regarding the
production, and evaluation of evidence and its use for decisions
(see also Teira, D. On the normative foundations of pharma-
ceutical regulation. In: La Caze A., Osimani B. (2018) Un-
certainty in Pharmacology: Epistemology, Methods and Deci-
sions. Boston Series for the Philosophy and History of Science,
Springer).
Various institutional instruments have been developed in or-
der to address these issues: evidential standards (e.g. evidence
hierarchies proposed within the EBM paradigm), decision-
rules (e.g. the precautionary principle), and deontological
norms. We started to investigate the joint interaction of such
dimensions by developing a Bayesian model of hypothesis con-
firmation which takes into account both random and systematic
error (Landes J. Osimani B., (2018) Varieties of Error and Va-
rieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference, under review). In
particular, we examined the interplay of coherence and consis-
tency of evidence, with source(s) reliability. Our results partly
confirm Bovens and Hartmann (Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S.
(2003), Bayesian Epistemology. OUP) and Claveau (Claveau F.
The Independence Condition in the Variety-of-Evidence The-
sis. Philosophy of Science, 2013, 80, pp. 94–118), who inves-
tigate similar epistemic dynamics, but we realize that Bovens
and Hartmann’s results concerning the failure of the variety of
evidence thesis (VET), mainly rely on their randomizing in-
strument being so in a specific way: when its probability of de-
livering positive reports (no matter what the truth is) is higher
than .5 the instrument tends to be a “yes-man”, whereas it is
a “nay-sayer” if this probability drops below .5. In the former
case, consistency of positive reports from the same instrument
speaks in favour of it being a randomizer (and therefore weak-
ens their confirmatory strength), whereas the opposite holds for
the latter case, which explains VET failure there. In our model
the VET fails too, but the area of failure is considerably smaller
and depends on the ratio of false to true positives of the biased
vs. reliable instrument affected by random error; the take-home
message is that replication with the same instrument is favoured
when the noise of the reliable instrument exceeds the system-
atic error of the biased one. We plan to further explore these
results by modeling different sorts of replications and features
of reliability in various scientific settings, and embed them in an






AppMath&ComSci: International Conference on Applied
Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science, India, 1–3
February.
IaSK: Imagination as a Source of Knowledge, University of
Cologne, 2–3 February.
PresDat: Presenting Data, London, 6 February.
BDAAI&CL: Big Data, Analytics, AI and Machine Learning,
Ontario, Canada, 7 February.
WoMR: Workshop on Mathematical Reasoning, Stanford Uni-
versity, 9–10 February.
MathStatCompSci: International Conference on Advances in
Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science, Dubai, 9–10
February.
A-SRSI: Agent-Specificities and Relationships in Social Inter-
actions, Cologne, Germany, 15–16 February.
OnBlf: Interdisciplinary Workshop on Belief, New York, 15–
16 February.
CM&Eval: Causal Modelling and Evaluation, Kings College
London, 19–23 February.
MA&EM: Modern Axiomatics and Early Metatheory, Univer-
sity of Vienna, 22–23 February.
MiN-CLogic: Doing Metaphysics in Non-Classical Logic, Lis-
bon, 22-23 February.
March
QPiPaL: Questioning Propositionalism in Philosophy and Lin-
guistics, Birkbeck, University of London, 12 March.
PoML: Philosophy of Machine Learning: Knowledge and
Causality, University of California, Irvine, 17–18 March.
RUaR: Relations, Unity, and Regress, University of Birming-
ham, 26–27 March.
BaCo: BAYESCOMP, Barcelona, Spain, 26–28 March.
April
JT: Just Theorising: Working Towards Responsible Method-
ologies, University of Sheffield, 9–10 April.
MotM: Models of the Mind: Reasoning About Oneself and
About Others, University of Edinburgh, 19 April.
Courses and Programmes
Courses
SIPTA: 8th School on Imprecise Probabilities, Oviedo, 24–28
July.
Computer SimulationMethods: Summer School, High Perfor-
mance Computing Center Stuttgart (HLRS), 25–29 September.
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